

ACADEMIC YEAR 2003

JOINT PROCESSES AND LANDPOWER DEVELOPMENT

COURSE 3

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SECTION I

COURSE OVERVIEW

1. General.

a. Course 3, Joint Processes and Landpower Development, of the U.S. Army War College's core curriculum is the course devoted to the study of the processes and systems within the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Staff, and the military departments that provide resources for the development of trained and ready forces for employment by the combatant commanders. The course examines how DOD and the Department of the Army respond to the strategic environment and develop and resource the force structure resulting in the landpower component of the nation's military. The course also examines DOD organizations, joint issues and processes, current defense resourcing issues, readiness, mobilization, military assistance to civil authorities (MACA), the Service transformations and management of organizational change, fiscal issues, and much more. This course builds on earlier courses and requires students to analyze, evaluate, and formulate resourcing and force structure decisions. It relates to warfighting competencies in ways many professional soldiers do not readily acknowledge or understand. Successful warfighting does not occur without well-trained, properly-equipped, and doctrinally-sound forces. The development, training, resourcing, equipping, and sustaining of our forces is directly about warfighting.

b. During Course 3, the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management (DCLM) will present these subjects in ways that will both encourage and challenge your ability to make decisions in complex and uncertain conditions when sufficient resources are unavailable or strategic guidance is vague. The goal is to provide a mentally stimulating learning environment that encourages reflection, reinforces critical thinking, and challenges your strategic decisionmaking skills. Resource-related decisionmaking in the DOD environment is based on rational models that require systems thinking, visioning, consensus-building, and other essential elements of strategic leadership. The focus will be on the operable systems, the responsibilities of individual decisionmakers, and the related organizational structures in the Department of Defense.

c. By the end of Course 3, you will be familiar with the processes and systems that drive the development of landpower forces. You will identify second- and third-order effects of actions taken pursuant to guidance and policy contained in the numerous processes. You will understand the relationship between various defense management systems and processes and the effects each have on the others. Finally, your knowledge of "How the Army Runs" should provide a foundation for modifying this system of systems to better facilitate the management of change in support of the on-going transformation effort.

d. In sum, Course 3 will broaden your horizon intellectually and provide a solid foundation for appreciating the complexity of defense resourcing that you will use the remainder of this year and throughout your careers.

2. Purpose.

a. Introduce students to the broad array of DOD organizations, systems, and processes used to allocate and manage resources and effect change.

b. Provide the students with an understanding of the Army's role in the development of the landpower component specified in the National Military Strategy.

c. Examine the concepts, systems, and processes employed by strategic leaders to resource the requirements of the National Military Strategy and ultimately to provide forces to the combatant commanders.

3. Objectives.

a. Analyze the roles of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commanders in resourcing and implementing the National Military Strategy.

b. Comprehend how the Department of Defense planning processes are used to implement and resource the National Military Strategy.

c. Synthesize how The Army manages change to create, modify, resource, and provide combat-ready forces to the combatant commanders.

d. Understand how MACA is provided as part of Homeland Security.

4. Scope. Course 3 has four modules.

a. Defense Structure and Joint Processes. This module provides students with an overview of DOD, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and The U.S. Army, and examines the nation's strategic planning processes. The module provides the students with an understanding of how the Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant Commanders interact to meet the United States' military needs. The module covers the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Joint Requirements Generation System and then more closely examines some of its major products such as the National Military Strategy, Joint Strategy Review, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Students will review the responsibilities and processes of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and how combatant commanders and the Services identify requirements and measure the readiness of their forces.

b. The Army. This module addresses the key processes and systems used throughout the Department of the Army to manage change. The current Army transformation effort will be used as a basis to examine and assess current Army systems and processes. Students study the force management systems that turn warfighting concepts into a viable force structure. Additionally, students will examine procedures and constraints related to providing MACA, procedures for mobilization and issues related to industrial mobilization, and applicable statutes and policies related to USAR, USNG, and DA civilian components of The Army. Finally, students participate with Senior Reserve Component Officers Course (SRCOC) attendees to examine issues related to The Army and participate in a MACA exercise responding to a Weapons of Mass Destruction incident.

c. Resourcing the Force. This module examines the systems and issues associated with manning, equipping, providing medical support, and funding the force. The module starts with Industry Day which is an examination of the critical partnership of the military and industry in the research and exploitation of science and technology, equipment development, and modernization of the force. Students will participate in a panel discussion with military and industry senior leaders, followed by seminar sessions with military acquisition and industry representatives to examine the issues related with rapidly exploiting technology. The remaining lessons in this module focus on how the Department of Defense uses the resources it is provided in order to meet the United States' military needs. We study the systems that provide dollars, personnel, and equipment resources to the force to understand how these systems support the requirements generated by the National Military Strategy. The current ongoing Army transformation will provide a practical case study for examining how organizational change can be managed and accelerated.

d. Strategy and Force Structuring. This module is intended to tie together the major analyses conducted during core Courses 1, 2, and 3. Virtually every Army Staff principal (headed by the Vice) is scheduled to come to the Army War College on Army Leader Day. The Vice will address the class and then the class will be divided and meet with their assigned staff principal for a discussion on related Army issues. Finally, a three-day practical exercise is conducted where each seminar will update their conceptual National Military Strategy (developed in Course 2) and, based upon that assessment and imposed resource constraints, develop a military operating force structure that best meets the projected strategic requirements. The exercise is scheduled during Course 4 and is intended to provide a military force structure framework for the Course 4 warfighting exercise.

5. Themes and Program for Joint Education (PJE). The USAWC curriculum addresses themes of enduring value and/or special emphasis. Course 3 concentrates on the following themes through lectures, student readings, and faculty and student presentations: Jointness, History, Strategic Vision, Homeland Security, Transformation, and Warfare in the 21st Century. Course 3 focuses on PJE learning areas, principally Learning Areas 2 and 3, “National Planning Systems and Processes” and “National Military Strategy and Organization.” Specific PJE learning objectives are listed and annotated in Section 5 of each lesson directive.

6. Curriculum Relationships. Course 3 continues to transition students from an operational perspective to the environment of the strategic leader. Students are introduced to the DOD resourcing bureaucracy in the politically-charged world of the most senior-level American military leadership. It provides learning opportunities related to the decisionmaking, planning, programming, force management, and other systems critical to the development of the landpower component of the National Military Strategy. In Course 3 the students will study the systems necessary to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders. The course follows the development of the national security and national military strategies identified in Course 2. Course 3 proceeds through the study of the defense and joint systems that provide the resource-constrained military force structure that is used to execute those strategies. The course continues with the study of how the systems allow strategic leaders to modernize and change those forces in order to keep pace with the dynamic strategic and operational environments. The resulting resource-constrained military force structure becomes the foundation for future military operations and requirements studied during Course 4.

SECTION II

STUDENT REQUIREMENTS

1. General. Course 3 offers numerous opportunities for students to share their experiences and knowledge while participating in the learning process. Faculty Instructors will identify the overall requirements for students during Lesson 2. At the end of Course 3, your Faculty Instructor (FI) will complete an evaluation of your course preparation, seminar participation, oral presentation, and written presentation. These evaluations, incorporated into the Student Assessment Report (SAR) in the Student Tracking System, will be included in your individual academic electronic file from which your final Academic Efficiency Report (AER) will be written.

2. Preparation. Thorough preparation for each seminar discussion is essential to the learning process. As a minimum, you will be expected to study the required readings specified in each lesson found in Section IV of this course directive. In addition, you can expect to be designated to make a presentation and lead discussions for various lessons. As a discussion leader you may have additional organizing, planning, or directing responsibilities, as well as the requirement to coordinate or conduct broader research into the suggested reading material and reserve references in the library. Your FI will evaluate the quality of your preparation based on your demonstrated knowledge of required course material.

3. Participation. With your background and experience, you will bring to your seminar invaluable insights that other members may have no knowledge. The mutual exchange of individual experience and perspective is as vital to the learning process at the Army War College as basic preparation. Therefore, you are an essential part of both the active-learning process and teaching team. Your active participation in all seminar activities, exercises, and discourse is important to the entire learning effort. Participation involves being a good listener, an articulate spokesperson, and an intelligent, tactful challenger of ideas. As previously mentioned, your FI will evaluate your participation as part of the end-of-course evaluation based primarily on the quality of your contribution to each lesson.

4. Presentations.

a. General. Your ability to express yourself clearly, concisely, and courteously is essential to the learning process. Most of your oral presentations will be made as a member or representative of a subgroup or as a voluntary contributor to routine seminar dialog and discussion. This ability will be evaluated throughout the course on an informal basis and formally recorded on your end-of-course SAR.

b. Specific. There is one formal individual oral presentation and one written presentation for Course 3 that will be evaluated as separate requirements. The evaluation will be included in the end-of-course SAR. The specific oral and written presentations are associated with different lessons throughout Course 3 and are further explained as follows:

(1) Oral. The oral requirement will be an individual or team presentation of the material covered in a specific reading or a comprehensive discussion of an issue or topic area associated with a lesson in Course 3. The FI will identify to each student those lessons that have oral requirements during Lesson 1, and assignments will be made shortly thereafter.

(2) Written. The written requirement can be accomplished by one of two options at the discretion of the FI. FIs may require students to write a 5-7-page paper addressing assigned course-related comprehensive questions regarding joint processes or landpower development. The questions will require students to research, critically assess and synthesize force management issues and related processes, and to demonstrate their understanding of Course 3 material. The FI will provide the questions for the written requirement in Lesson 1. Papers addressing assigned questions will be written in narrative style using direct, active voice sentences. Alternatively, the student may be assigned to write a position paper on a strategic-level issue with the necessary background information to substantiate the recommended position. The selected issue may be related to one or more of the comprehensive questions and will require a well-researched and focused development of a strategic-level solution/position. Moreover, the position paper will not exceed two pages in length and include purpose, discussion, and recommendation sections. See page C-7 in JFSC Pub 1 for more guidance on the format and content of the position paper.

c. Standards. The purposes of the oral and written presentations are to demonstrate a clear understanding of a particular aspect of Course 3 material and to further develop your personal oral and written communication skills. These presentations will also demonstrate your ability to apply the elements of critical thinking that are appropriate to the subject being presented and to understand how senior leaders should approach complex issues. Evaluation standards will be consistent with those described in CBks Memorandum No. 623-1: Personnel Evaluation; USAWC Student Academic Assessment System.

SECTION III

COURSE 3: JOINT PROCESSES AND LANDPOWER DEVELOPMENT ACADEMIC YEAR 2003, 21 OCTOBER – 6 DECEMBER 2002

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
21 October (1) <hr/> Lsn 3-1-L Intro to Course 3 Lsn 3-2-S, 0930-1130 Defense Organization <hr/> NTL—Implementing Joint Vision <hr/> Lsn 3-3-DS for JSR/Sem NMS Develop	22 October (1) <hr/> Lsn 3-3-S Joint Strategic Planning System <hr/> NTL—Transforming the Force-the OSD View <hr/>	23 October (1) <hr/> Lsn 3-4-S Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (DMSPO) <hr/>	24 October (1) <hr/> Lsn 3-5-S Joint Requirements: JROC, JWCA, & IPL <hr/> NTL—Strategic Readiness System: Transforming Army Readiness Reporting <hr/>	25 October (1) <hr/> Lsn 3-6-S Readiness: CRS to Army SRS <hr/>
28 October (2) <hr/> Lsn 3-7-L; CLS: Why Force Management? <hr/> Lsn 3-8-DS for JSCP and Review FM Charts	29 October (1) <hr/> Lsn 3-8-L/S JSCP (DMSPO) <hr/> Lsn 3-9-DS Directed Study (Objective Force Requirements)	30 October (2) <hr/> Lsn 3-9-S Force Management and Transformation <hr/> NTL--Acquisition Challenges for Transformation <hr/>	31 October (3) <hr/> Lsn 3-10-L/P Transformation: Partnering with Industry <hr/> NTL-Transformation Enabling Science and Technology <hr/> Lsn 3-10-S Industry Seminar	1 November (3) <hr/> Lsn 3-11-P CLS Army G-1 Panel: Manning the Force <hr/>
4 November (2) <hr/> Lsn 3-12-S Army Components <hr/> NTL—Mobilization challenges <hr/> SRCOC	5 November (2) <hr/> Lsn 3-13-S Mobilization <hr/> NTL—Meeting the Media <hr/> SRCOC	6 November (2) <hr/> Lsn 3-14-S MACA <hr/> NTL—Civil Support <hr/> Lsn 3-14-EX MACA Exercise <hr/> SRCOC	7 November (3) <hr/> Lsn 3-15-L/S Trends in the Federal Budget <hr/> SRCOC	8 November <hr/> Training Holiday
11 November (3) <hr/> Veterans' Day (Holiday)	12 November (3) <hr/> Lsn 3-16-L/S PPBS/PPBES <hr/>	13 November (4) <hr/> Lsn 3-17-L/P CLS: Army Leader Day <hr/> Lsn 3-17-BB ALD Sem Brief-back	14 November <hr/> Course 4 Begins Lsn 4-01 JOPES <hr/>	15 November <hr/> Lsn 4-02 Theater Strategy <hr/>
18 November <hr/> Lsn 4-03 Op Art I <hr/>	19 November <hr/> Lsn 4-04 Op Art II <hr/>	20 November <hr/> Lsn 4-05 Campaign Design <hr/> NTL—USAF Transformation <hr/>	21 November <hr/> Lsn 4-06 USAF Employment <hr/> NTL—USN Transformation <hr/>	22 November <hr/> Lsn 4-07 USN Employment <hr/>

COURSE 3: JOINT PROCESSES AND LANDPOWER DEVELOPMENT
ACADEMIC YEAR 2003, 21 OCTOBER – 6 DECEMBER

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
25 November <hr/> Lsn 4-08 USMC Employment <hr style="border-top: 1px dashed;"/> NTL—USMC Transformation <hr style="border-top: 1px dashed;"/>	26 November <hr/> Lsn 4-09 SOF Employment <hr style="border-top: 1px dashed;"/> NTL—SOF Transformation <hr/> Army Transformation	27 November <hr/> Lsn 4-10 Army Employment <hr style="border-top: 1px dashed;"/>	28 November <hr/> <u>Thanksgiving Recess</u>	29 November <hr/> <u>Thanksgiving Recess</u>
2 December <hr/> <u>Thanksgiving Recess</u>	3 December <hr/> Lsn 4-11 Theater Army <hr style="border-top: 1px dashed;"/> NTL—Force Structure Exercise Data Management <hr style="border-top: 1px dashed;"/>	4 December (4) <hr/> Lsn 3-18- EX Transformation and Force Structure Ex <hr style="border-top: 1px dashed;"/> <hr/> Lsn 3-18-EX Transformation and Force Structure Ex	5 December (4) <hr/> Lsn 3-18- EX Transformation and Force Structure Ex <hr style="border-top: 1px dashed;"/> <hr/> Lsn 3-18-DS Transformation and Force Structure Ex	6 December (4) <hr/> Lsn 3-18-EX Transformation and Force Structure Ex Briefings

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3-3-S	Joint Strategic Planning System	20
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3-7-L/S	Why Force Management?.	34
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INTRODUCTION TO COURSE 3

“JOINT PROCESSES AND LANDPOWER DEVELOPMENT”

Mode: Lecture

Lesson No. 3-1-L

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson is a Bliss Hall lecture by the Course Director and introduces the student to Course 3, “Joint Processes and Landpower Development.”

b. Course 1 developed the concept that the strategic-leadership environment consists of both internal and external complexities that directly and indirectly affect the resourcing, structuring, and operational performance of the organization. Moreover, organizational performance is profoundly influenced by the competency and effectiveness of its strategic leadership. To be both effective and efficient, the strategic leader must have a basic understanding of the organizational structure and functions of the system of systems to effectively manage change, transform the organization, and ensure the efforts are institutionalized both in policy and culture.

c. Course 2 covered strategic art and grand strategy and the strategic-planning environment in terms of the study of war, national security policy, and national security and national military strategies. It set the context for the formulation of the current National Military Strategy based on an integrated strategic approach embodied by the terms *Assuring* allies, *Dissuading* adversaries, *Deterring* aggression, and *Decisively Defeating* adversaries if aggression fails. This strategic framework is outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Draft NSS, and Draft NMS. These strategic concepts provide the framework for The Army and the other Services as they face the many challenges emerging over the next several years.

d. Course 3 builds on the “strategy” developed and assessed in Course 2 and follows the processes of how it is translated into “requirements” and then “resourced.” The course examines the systems and processes within the Department of Defense (DOD) and looks at how they are used to manage change to develop trained and ready forces to implement our Nation’s strategies. Dramatic transformational changes in organizations, equipment and doctrine, growth in the number and type of missions, increased reliance on the Reserve Components, and greatly reduced resourcing levels contribute significantly to the complexity of defense resourcing decisions examined during Course 3.

e. Essentially Course 3 studies how the Army manages change. The various force management-related systems used to manage the Army's funds, personnel, equipment, installations, doctrine development, training, and organizations are also the instruments used to change The Army. Unfortunately, the history of The Army includes periods of unreadiness attributable to the failure to properly manage needed change. In recent years The Army has worked hard to educate leaders on the significance of managing change within many of the systems you will study during Course 3. As a future strategic leader, what you know about "How the Army Runs" will profoundly influence how well it runs. The intent of Course 3 is to help provide a foundation for acquiring that knowledge.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the content of Course 3 and how it relates to the overall USAWC curriculum.

b. Comprehend the student evaluation instruments used during Course 3.

c. Apply the participation standards and requirements for Course 3.

d. Comprehend how Course 3 will likely fill a void in a student's professional development.

e. Comprehend how the military uses established systems and processes to manage change and how those systems can influence the ability to effect change.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Read, as required, and prepare for seminar dialog.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Course 3 Directive. [Instructor Handout]

(2) U.S. Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002. Chapter 1, pp. 1-1 to 1-8. [Student Issue] Also available at: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/LinkedHTARChapters/CHAPTER1.pdf>. Accessed 4 September 2002.

(3) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume I. [Student Issue]

(a) Department of the Army. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Human Resources Directorate. Army Demographics FY01. Washington, DC: pp. 1-3. Not available on line.

(b) Rumsfeld, Donald H. "DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff--Bureaucracy to Battlefield." Speech. Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 10 September 2001, pp. 4-10. Also available at:
<<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010910-secdef.html>>. Accessed 4 September 2002.

(c) Peters, Katherine McIntire. "Grave New World." Government Executive, August 1999, pp. 11-14. Also available at:
<<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?Did=000000044311217&Fmt=4&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=1&Sid=3&RQT=309>>. Accessed 4 September 2002.

4. Points to Consider.

a. How important is it for senior leaders to understand the Army's Force Management Systems? Can they effectively plan to implement change without knowledge of the systems used to manage change?

b. Will the transformation of the military need to begin with the transformation of its systems used to manage change? Is it possible to effect rapid change by bypassing those systems? What could be some of the expected impacts on the organization if these systems are circumvented rather than changed first? What could be the long-term impacts on the change effort?

c. How is the tension between cost, efficiency, and timeliness reflected in the systems the military uses to manage change? What is usually sacrificed when developing routine and long-term bureaucratic organizational processes used to manage change? How can this be remedied?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

a. PJE LA 2.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.

b. PJE LA 2.b. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.

c. PJE LA 3.b. Objectives; Points to Consider.

d. PJE LA 6.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 1 and 5.
- b. Enduring Themes: History, Strategic Vision, and Jointness.
- c. Special Themes: Homeland Security, Transformation, and Warfare in the 21st Century.

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson No. 3-2-S

1. Introduction.

a. The Department of Defense, as specified by Congress, is broadly organized into four main entities with specific responsibilities to execute the military aspects of the National Security Strategy. These organizational entities are the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commands, and Military Departments.

b. This lesson will review the overall U.S. Defense structure and responsibilities. It will then examine both the historical and current relationship that exists between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commands, and Services. Over the past 50 years, Congress has passed legislation that has affected the relationship between these four main entities, but the one constant theme has been civilian control of the military.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Understand the current Defense organizational structure and how it has evolved over time.

b. Comprehend the statutory responsibilities of the CJCS with respect to national strategic planning.

c. Examine how civilian control is executed within the current defense structure.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Required Readings.

(1) National Defense University. Joint Forces Staff College. JFSC Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officers Guide 2000. Chapter 1, pp. 1-1 to 1-27. [Student Issue] Also available at: http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/jsog_pub/jsogpub_1_2000.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2002.

(2) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume I. [Student Issue]

(a) Title 10, United States Code: Armed Forces (As Amended through February 1999). Prepared for the use of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999. Read Sections 111-113, 131-143, 151-155, and 161-165, pp. 15-44. Also available at: <http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/>. Accessed 4 September 2002.

(b) Fiore, Uldric L., Jr. "Defense Secretariat Reform." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1999-2000, pp. 45-51. Also available at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1623.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2002.

(c) Roberts, Lee, SSG. "Shalikashvili Grades Goldwater-Nichols Progress." American Forces Information Service News Articles, December 18, 1996, pp. 52-54. Also available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1996/n12181996_9612182.html. Accessed 4 September 2002.

b. Suggested Readings.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs>. Accessed 4 September 2002. Use this site to understand the organization and missions of all the directorates.

c. Focused Readings.

(1) Magregor, Douglas A. "The Joint Force: A Decade, No Progress." Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 2000-01, pp. 18-23. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0727.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2002.

(2) Roman, Peter J., and Tarr, David W. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness." Political Science Quarterly, Spring 1998, pp. 91-111. Available at: <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?Did=000000029165885&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=1&Sid=2&RQT=309>. Accessed 4 September 2002.

(3) Wolfowitz, Paul et al. "Testimony Delivered on Military Transformation." DefenseLINK, 9 April 2002, pp. 1-31. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020409-depsecdef1.html>. Accessed 4 September 2002.

(4) Wolfowitz, Paul. "Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Military Transformation." DefenseLINK, 9 April 2002, pp. 1-16. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020409-depsecdef1.html>. Accessed 4 September 2002.

(5) Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint History Office. Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1989, November 1989, pp. 1-68.

4. Points to Consider.

a. How has the formal relationship changed between the major entities of the military structure (OSD, JCS/Joint Staff, Military Departments, and Combatant Commands)? What are some of the principles that have driven or constrained those changes? Has the GNA created a de facto General Staff? How would the current Chairman rate progress on GNA-intended reforms? Have we progressed or digressed from when Shalikashvili rated progress in 1996?

b. How is civilian control over the military maintained? Will intended Secretariat reforms combining the Service Secretariats with Military Service Staffs undermine that control? What are some of the unintended consequences of streamlining Service and OSD bureaucracies?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

a. PJE LA 1.b. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.

b. PJE LA 1.c. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.

c. PJE LA 3.b. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILOs: 1 and 2.

b. Enduring Themes: History and Jointness.

c. Special Themes: Homeland Security and Transformation.

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

Mode: Seminar
Directed Study (21 October, 1300-1500)

Lesson No. 3-3-S

1. Introduction.

a. National military planning employs an ends-ways-means paradigm with planning, resourcing, and execution systems that principally address each part of this paradigm. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), managed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), is the national-level planning system that primarily focuses on the “ways” part of this paradigm.

b. The JSPS is the primary and formal means by which the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders, meets his planning and policy responsibilities outlined in Title 10, U.S. Code. These responsibilities include: providing advice for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces; preparing strategic plans and assessments; providing advice on force deficiencies, capabilities, and strengths; and providing advice on requirements, programs, and budget proposals.

c. This lesson will examine the JSPS and its specific products. In doing so, we will focus on the key relationships between the specific JSPS products and other policy and resourcing documents produced by the Services, Combatant Commanders, the Secretary of Defense, and the President.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend how the JSPS helps the CJCS meet his statutory responsibilities.

b. Understand how the JSPS interfaces with policy and resourcing documents authored by the President, Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, and the Services.

c. Synthesize information learned at the Army War College to date and determine the most and least important missions for the military in 2020.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) The seminar will cover learning objectives a and b during the Faculty Instructor's presentation of the JSPS and the readings.

(2) Students will review the classified Joint Strategy Review in the prior day's Directed Study to gain an appreciation of how the military views the future strategic environment.

(3) The students will conduct a classroom exercise to determine what the most and least important missions are for the military in 2020, based on what they have learned at the Army War College to date.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume I. [Student Issue]

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01A: Joint Strategic Planning System, 1 September 1999, pp. 55-89. Also available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3100_01a.pdf>. As an alternative, scan the CJCSI and work through the interactive modules posted on the intranet at: <<http://cbnet/orgs/dcs/material/541/toolbook/jsps.tbk>> and at <<http://cbnet/orgs/dcs/material/541/JSPSDiag.htm>>.

(2) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Vision 2020, pp. 1-44. [Student Initial Textbook Issue] Also available at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/>>.

(3) Joint Strategy Review. The classified Joint Strategy Review will be picked up by the Seminar Security Officers prior to class and secured in seminar safes. Readings will be done in Directed Study period on 21 October.

c. Focused Reading.

U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume I. [Student Issue]

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02A: Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan, 15 April 2001, pp. 90-169. Also available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3010_02a.pdf>.

4. Points to Consider.

a. How does the JSPS assist the CJCS in providing planning, policy, and resourcing advice to the Secretary of Defense and President?

b. How does the military's assessment of the future environment affect its missions and needed capabilities in 2020?

c. Does Joint Vision 2020 properly consider the threats and challenges of the future strategic environment?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

- a. PJE LA 1.a. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.
- b. PJE LA 1.b. Readings; Objectives.
- c. PJE LA 2.a. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.
- d. PJE LA 2.b. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.
- e. PJE LA 2.c. Readings; Objectives.
- f. PJE LA 3.b. Readings; Objectives.
- g. PJE LA 3.c. Readings; Objectives.
- h. PJE LA 6.b. Readings; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 1, 2, 3, and 4.
- b. Enduring Themes: Jointness and Strategic Vision.
- c. Special Themes: Transformation and Warfare in the 21st Century.

UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF)

Mode: Seminar

Lesson No. 3-4-S

1. Introduction. This is a Capstone Lesson in your Army War College education. In whatever you do here at Carlisle and beyond, your thoughts, guidance, directives, and actions should aim to achieve cohesion and integration whereby the product exceeds the sum of the parts. Since their inception, the principles of war have included “unity of command.” More recently, the principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) have included “unity of effort.” The time-tested messages are that “in unity there is strength” and that the complexities of the profession of arms demand “unified action.” Military history offers abundant examples where the lack of unified effort led to disaster as well as examples where unified effort focused, synchronized, and directed energy in a decisively positive manner. Achieving and leveraging such unity does not come by accident. It cannot be left to strategic, operational, or tactical chance. The “Unified Action Armed Forces^x” lesson examines DOD relationships, command and control, the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and the implications of achieving unified action in the multinational and interagency environment. You will see that unified action is codified in United States Law (USC Title 10) and articulated in Joint Doctrine. It also extends into the interagency arena. Over the years we have witnessed numerous changes to the concept of UNAAF manifest U.S. law, in doctrine, and in the content of the UCP. Changes within the past year, particularly with respect to the UCP, have been comparatively profound. We have learned through experience that jointness at the operational and strategic levels is a prerequisite to success. Today we are learning that the effective integration of multinational partners, the interagency, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and others with joint U.S. military forces is powerful. This phenomenon propels our traditional view of UNAAF to an exponentially potent extension of the concept that might be written as UNAAF^x.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Analyze the warfighting and day-to-day relationships among the crafters and implementers of the National Military Strategy including the President and Secretary of Defense (formerly the “National Command Authorities”), DOD, CJCS, Service Chiefs, Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders (formerly the “CINCs”), and the interagency as defined in Joint Pub 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

b. Understand the definitions and implications of doctrinal U.S. command and control relationships including Combatant Command (COCOM), Operational Control (OPCON), Tactical Control (TACON), and Support, and “other authorities” including

Administrative Control, Coordinating Authority, and Direct Liaison Authorized as defined in Joint Pub 0-2.

c. Examine the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Understand its origins, purpose, and content, and its relationship to achieving UNAAF. Pay particular attention to the emerging homeland defense mission and the distribution of global geographic responsibilities which, for the first time, assign all air, land, and sea space to the combatant commands.

d. Appreciate how the missions and responsibilities articulated in the UCP combined with the DOD relationships and command and control authority defined in Joint Pub 0-2 translate into day-to-day operations for the regional and functional Combatant Commanders.

e. Consider possible alternatives and enhancements to facilitate unified action in the context of an ever-changing global political, military, economic, and informational landscape.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings and be prepared to discuss their content and implications in seminar.

(2) Be prepared to define and offer examples of the DOD relationships and command authority as expressed in Joint Pub 0-2. This will be essential to the examination of the implementation of national security strategy, campaign planning, and crisis action response in Course 4.

(3) Analyze the content of the UCP in the context of UNAAF. Understand the cycle for reviewing and revising the UCP, and consider the rationale for and relevance of the present document.

(4) Consider the implications of the changing political, military, economic, and informational landscape upon the traditional views of UNAAF. Be prepared to discuss alternatives to address these changes and the world of multinational and interagency operations. Be prepared to defend existing aspects of UNAAF, including the UCP, that should be sustained.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001, per “roadmap” to be distributed by DMSPO FI prior to the lesson. [Student Issue]

(2) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume I. [Student Issue]

(a) Unified Command Plan, 30 April 2002, pp. 170-192.

(b) Memorandum for Joint Staff Directors dated 11 January 2002, Subject: "Use of the Term "National Command Authorities," p. 193.

(c) USJFCOM JWFC Information Paper dated 6 May 2002, Subject: "Use of the Term 'Commander in Chief' or 'CINC'," p. 194.

(d) CHINFO Washington DC Message 282000Z Jun 02, Subject: "Public Affairs Guidance – Merger of U.S. Strategic Command," pp. 195-199.

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) Joint Chiefs of Staff "JCSLink" provides current information concerning the Combatant Commands (click "Organization"; click "Combatant Commands"; then select the desired command). Available at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/>>.

(2) U.S. Commission on National Security, 21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission). Phase I Report: New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century. Available at: <<http://www.nssg.gov>>.

(3) U.S. Commission on National Security, 21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission). Phase II Report: Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom. Available at: <<http://www.nssg.gov>>.

(4) Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office. The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993. Available in the AWC library.

4. Points to Consider.

a. What is the meaning of Unified Action Armed Forces? How is it facilitated and achieved through law, doctrine, and the UCP?

b. What are the command warfighting relationships between the combatant commands and the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the JCS?

c. What are the definitions and implications of the U.S. doctrinal command relationships including COCOM, OPCON, TACOM, and Support?

d. What is the purpose of the UCP? What missions, AORs, and roles has the UCP assigned to the regional and functional Combatant Commanders? What is the significance of the command relationships as articulated in Joint Pub 0-2 to the UCP?

e. Consider the present and future strategic, operational, and tactical landscape. Are UNAAF doctrine and the UCP on the mark? What are their strengths and weaknesses? How does the reality of multinational and interagency operations affect UNAAF, and how do you ensure unity of effort in these environments?

f. Consider the implications of the global war on terrorism and the homeland defense mission upon the theme of this lesson. What challenges, issues, and requirements come to mind?

g. How is civilian control over the military and civil-military relations facilitated by UNAAF?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

a. PJE LA 1.a. Suggested Readings.

b. PJE LA 1.b. Points to Consider; Objectives; Required Readings; Practical Exercise.

c. PJE LA 1.c. Objectives; Required Readings; Points to Consider; Practical Exercise.

d. PJE LA 1.d. Points to Consider; Suggested Readings.

e. PJE LA 3.a. Objectives; Points to Consider; Required Readings; Practical Exercise.

f. PJE LA 3.b. Objectives; Required Readings; Points to Consider.

g. PJE LA 4.a. Required Readings; Suggested Readings; Practical Exercise; Points to Consider; Objectives.

h. PJE LA 4.b. Points to Consider; Objectives; Required Readings; Practical Exercise; Suggested Readings.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILOs: 2, 3, and 4.

b. Enduring Themes: History, Strategic Vision, and Jointness.

c. Special Themes: Civil-Military Relations and Warfare in the 21st Century.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson No. 3-5-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson focuses on two ways the CJCS and the Combatant Commanders directly influence requirements that are procured by the Services to execute the National Military Strategy. First, the CJCS provides advice to the Secretary of Defense on military requirements by using the decisionmaking process of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Secondly, the Combatant Commanders provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on specific warfighting needs through submission of Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs).

b. The CJCS uses the JROC to assist him on the following: identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements and acquisition programs; assessing warfighting capabilities and reviewing warfighting deficiencies; and considering alternatives to certain acquisition programs. The JROC uses the analytical work of Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams which are composed of experts from the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and others as needed. These teams examine joint warfighting and support issues and identify opportunities for improvement.

c. The Combatant Commanders identify their specific warfighting needs to the Secretary of Defense by submitting a document called IPL. The IPLs are forwarded to the Services who have to identify how they are meeting these requirements to the Secretary of Defense as part of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend how the CJCS and Combatant Commanders identify joint military requirements, resolve warfighting issues, and influence resource allocations.

b. Evaluate the influence of the JROC and how it is being changed.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) The faculty instructor will lead discussions on the JROC and the JWCA process.

(2) Selected students will lead discussions on the focused readings to assess the effectiveness of the JROC and reasons it was changed.

(3) Students will review and discuss current Combatant Commander IPLs (classified documents) in the seminar room.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume I. [Student Issue]

(a) Davis, M. Thomas. "The JROC: In Need of Restructuring." Strategic Review, Summer 1998, pp. 200-203.

(b) U.S. Department of Defense. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5123.01: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 8 March 2001, pp. 204-227. Also available at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/5123_01a.pdf. Internet accessed 16 June 2002.

(c) Myers, Richard B. "Posture Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 February 2002," pp. 228-255. Also available at: http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2002/Myers.pdf. Internet accessed 16 June 2002.

(2) Classified IPLs are picked up by Seminar Security Officer. Read in class.

c. Focused Readings.

(1) Peterson, Gordon I. "An Advocate for Jointness." Sea Power, February 2000, pp. 9-14. [Faculty Instructor Handout]

(2) Philpott, Tom. "Low Profile High Impact." The Retired Officers Association, June 1999, pp. 67-70. [Faculty Instructor Handout]

(3) Owens, William A. "Making the Joint Journey." Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999, pp. 92-95. Also available at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1721.pdf. Internet accessed 16 June 2002.

(4) Pace, Peter. "Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 April 2002," pp. 1-7. Available at: http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2002/April/Pace.pdf. Internet accessed 16 June 2002.

(5) Myers, Richard B. "Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, 4 April 2000," pp. 1-4. Available at: http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2000/000404rm.pdf. Internet accessed 16 June 2002.

(6) U.S. Department of Defense. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3137.01A: The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process, 22 January 1999. Available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3137_01a.pdf>. Internet accessed 16 June 2002.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Blair, Dennis C. "Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year 2001 Posture Statement, 7 March 2000." Available at: <http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2000/000307db.pdf>. Internet accessed 16 June 2002.

(2) Gehman, Harold W. "Statement Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate, 4 April 2000." Available at: <http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2000/000404hg.pdf>. Internet accessed 16 June 2002.

4. Points to Consider.

a. How has the JROC increased the influence of the JCS in providing advice to the NCA regarding the future U.S. military structure and weapon systems?

b. What factors influence the credibility of the work of the JWCA teams and the JROC decisions?

c. How descriptive are Combatant Commander IPLs in influencing resource allocations?

5. Relationship to Professional Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

a. PJE LA 1.a. Readings.

b. PJE LA 1.b. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider. c. PJE LA 1.d. Readings. d. PJE LA 2.a. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider. e. PJE LA 2.b. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider. f. PJE LA 3.a. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider. g. PJE LA 5.a. Readings; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes. a. ILOs: 1, 2, 4, and 5. b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Vision and Jointness. c. Special Themes: Warfare in the 21st Century, Civil-Military Relations, and Transformation.

READINESS: CHAIRMAN'S SYSTEM TO ARMY STRATEGIC READINESS SYSTEM

Mode: Seminar

Lesson No. 3-6-S

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson first focuses on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS) strategic readiness system. This system uses information provided in the Services' readiness reports and the Combatant Commanders' and Combat Support Agencies' readiness reports to determine the readiness of the military to execute the National Military Strategy. This strategic assessment is briefed to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) and is reported to Congress.

b. The Combatant Commanders and Combat Support Agencies use a reporting system comprised of Joint Monthly Readiness Reports (JMRRs) to assess their readiness. The JMRRs are conducted in one of three ways during a quarter. The Full JMRR, normally the first month of a quarter, is a snapshot of the ability of the military to execute a particular scenario. The By-Exception JMRR, conducted in months when there is no Full JMRR, reports whether there were major improvements or degradations to the previous Full JMRR. The Feedback JMRR, normally two months after a Full JMRR, covers actions taken to address significant deficiencies reported in the Full JMRR.

c. The Services have their own readiness processes that generally use monthly unit reporting that is aggregated at higher levels to measure their ability to provide trained and ready forces to the Combatant Commanders. The Army is transitioning to a Strategic Readiness System (SRS), which uses an integrated strategic management and measurement approach, to determine readiness at all levels of the Army's operating and generating forces. The SRS consists of two parts. The first part identifies a unit's goals and objectives, and the second part is an automated data collection. The overall objective of the SRS is to provide timely and accurate information to allow for better allocation of resources to resolve problems.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the process the CJCS uses to assess the readiness of the military to execute the full range of missions required by the National Military Strategy.

b. Analyze JMRR reports and determine which warfighting issues are important to the different combatant commanders.

c. Understand the Army's Strategic Readiness System.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) The Faculty Instructor will lead discussions on the JMRR process covered in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction and cover information on the SRS from the prior day's noontime lecture.

(2) Students will review and discuss Combatant Commander JMRRs (classified documents) in the seminar room.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume I. [Student Issue]

(a) Title 10, United States Code: Armed Forces (As Amended through February 1999). Prepared for the use of the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999. Read Section 117, pp. 256-257. Also available at: <<http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/>>.

(b) U.S. Department of Defense. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3401.01B CH-1: Chairman's Readiness System, 19 June 2000, pp. 258-313. Also available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3401_01b.pdf>.

(c) Eaglen, Mackenzie M. "A New Look at Readiness: Solving the Army's Quandary." National Security Watch, 30 March 2001, pp. 314-317. Also available at: <<http://www.ausa.org/ausanews>>.

(d) Army Announces Strategic Readiness System, p. 318. Also available at: <http://hqda-aoc.army.pentagon.mil/AOC_Org/ODR/>. Accessed 3 September 2002.

(e) FAQs on SRS, pp. 319-322. Also available at: <http://hqda-aoc.army.pentagon.mil/AOC_Org/ODR/>. Accessed 3 September 2002.

(2) Classified Readiness Reports in class. These are to be picked up by Seminar Security Officers and kept in the safe until the lesson.

c. Focused Readings.

(1) Testimony of the Service Vices to the House Armed Services Committee on 7 March 2002. Access testimony by going to web site: <<http://www.house.gov/hasc>>, click on Schedules and Transcripts, click on 2002, scroll to 7 March, and scroll to Military Readiness Subcommittee, or use the following addresses:

<<http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-03-07keane.html>>.

<<http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-03-07fallon.html>>.

<<http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-03-07foglesong.html>>.

<<http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-03-07williams.html>>.

4. Points to Consider.

- a. How comprehensive is the Chairman's readiness system in assessing the readiness of military forces in meeting the NMS?
- b. How are readiness issues different depending on the combatant commander?
- c. How effective are the Service's readiness testimonies?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

- a. PJE LA 1.b. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.
- b. PJE LA 1.c. Readings.
- c. PJE LA 2.a. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.
- d. PJE LA 3.a. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.
- e. PJE LA 3.b. Readings; Objectives.
- f. PJE LA 3.c. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7.
- b. Enduring Theme: Jointness.
- c. Special Themes: Transformation and Warfare in the 21st Century.

WHY FORCE MANAGEMENT?

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

Directed Study (24 October, 1300-1600)

Lesson No. 3-7-L/S

1. Introduction.

a. The lesson begins with a lecture by LTG (R) Richard Trefry. As the Army's foremost expert on Force Management, he will cover the basic framework of the development and importance of force management as a discipline and the role of the responsible major organizations and systems in managing The Army. Following the lecture, students will dialog in seminar on both his presentation and the role of Army doctrine in framing organizational change. Finally, in the afternoon, the students will participate in a Directed Study period where half of the seminar will read the JSCP while the other half will sequentially rotate to the Gymnasium to review the History of Force Management Charts reflecting the major force management events since 1940.

b. Title 10, United States Code, is the principal basis of Army functions. Under this statute, The Army is required to perform the functions that organize, train, and equip forces capable of accomplishing missions as a component command of a unified command. The Army must continuously change in order to provide the most combat-effective force, within available resources, for joint and combined operations. To effectively and efficiently accomplish this challenge, it must have a coherent strategy for coordinating and integrating operational and managerial systems that collectively improve capabilities and readiness. When exigencies require those processes be accelerated, knowledgeable leaders can deliberately modify or change the processes to best accommodate the organizational requirements while maintaining both continuity and organizational efficiency. Failure to recognize the impact on and appropriately adjust the operative systems can both impede change and profoundly disrupt the organization.

c. Goldwater-Nichols substantially changed the relationships between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commands. The expanded role of the JROC and the implementation of the Joint Experimentation Program, together with many other joint initiatives, have crossed over into the realm heretofore the exclusive purview of the Services. Consequently, the understanding of Army systems and processes must be done in the context of related joint systems and processes. Thus, the answer to the question "Why Force Management" now transcends Army systems to all Services within DOD. Success at the senior-leader level is dependent, in no small measure, upon an understanding of joint and Army processes that support the execution of both the Title 10 functions and

related processes designed to satisfy the immediate needs of the combatant commanders. This lesson lays the foundation for understanding the importance of force management systems for all senior leaders.

d. The first chapter of Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War describes the testimony of then Major General Barry McCaffrey: “Shortly after the Gulf War, the Senate Armed Services Committee asked Major General Barry McCaffrey, commander of the 24th Infantry Division (Mech), how the war was won in only 100 hours. He replied, ‘This war didn’t take 100 hours to win, it took 15 years.’ McCaffrey’s sentiments reflect those of his generation who as young soldiers watched the Army fracture in Vietnam and who devoted most of their adult lives to the task of reforging the institution through a remarkable process of revolutionary reform.” The opening vignette in Chapter 1 describing the crew of Eagle 66 is representative of the force fielded as a result of the “small body of highly qualified, long service professionals” who were largely responsible for overcoming one of the most challenging institutional crisis ever faced by our Army. However, they overcame this crisis by centering their reforms “primarily on ideas and people rather than machines. To be sure, The Army went to war with first-class weaponry. But it was the quality of the young soldier and his leaders and the excellence of their operational method that proved so overwhelmingly decisive in the Gulf.”

e. The effective management of change is a strategic-leader task. During Course 1 you were introduced to the Army’s current ongoing transformation efforts. The various force management-related systems used to manage The Army are also used to change and transform The Army. They all have numerous second- and third-order effects and all are dependent on the leader’s mastery of the horizontal and vertical synchronization of JSPS, PPBS, JOPES, acquisition systems, and many more. The history of The Army includes periods of low readiness as a result of many circumstances, including the failure to properly manage change and the systems that control it. This lesson will identify Army experiences over time at managing change and specifically examines the critical role of doctrine in providing the framework for effecting change.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Comprehend recent Army force management initiatives.
- b. Know the importance of the Army’s management of change processes to senior-leader competency.
- c. Comprehend the definition of force management and understand its related support systems.
- d. Comprehend that The Army is run by a system of systems designed to manage change on a continual basis.
- e. Comprehend the role of doctrine in driving the change process within The Army.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Attend the lecture and participate in the question-and-answer period as well as in seminar dialog following the presentation.

(2) The Directed Study for Lesson 3-7-L/S will be done concurrently with the Directed Study for Lesson 3-6-S. During the Directed Study period, seminars will rotate to the new Thorpe Gymnasium and view the Army Force Management School "Mother of All Charts" depicting the development of Army Force Management from 1940 to 2002. The time schedule for the rotation will be posted in the Weekly Schedule.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002. Chapter 2, pp. 2-1 to 2-17. [Student Initial Issue] Also available at: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/LinkedHTARChapters/CHAPTER2.pdf>. Accessed 4 September 2002.

(2) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume I. [Student Issue]

a. Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army. Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War. Chapter 1: "Forging a New Army." Washington, DC: 1993, pp. 323-360. Not available on line.

b. Trefry, Richard G. "Soldiers and Warriors: Warriors and Soldiers." The American Warrior, 1992, pp. 361-372. Not available on line.

c. Focused Reading. [To be assigned by the Faculty Instructor]

Romjue, John L. American Army Doctrine for the Post Cold War. Military History Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command and Center of Military History, United States Army. Introduction; Chapter I: "Army Doctrine and the Strategic Shift"; and Chapter VI: "An Assessment." Washington, DC: 1997, pp. 5-32; 130-141. [Library Reserve Shelf.] Not available on line.

4. Points to Consider.

a. What were the circumstances that prompted The Army to initiate reforms in the decade of the '70s?

b. Identify the major reform initiatives of the last two decades. Assess their impact and identify their intended and unintended effects.

c. Can the Army's last 20 years best be described as a period of evolutionary or revolutionary change? Why?

d. What was the strategic vision that drove the changes of the last two decades?

e. Is The Army moving away from doctrine driving change?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

a. PJE LA 1.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.

b. PJE LA 1.d. Readings; Points to Consider.

c. PJE LA 2.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.

d. PJE LA 3.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILOs: 1 and 5.

b. Enduring Themes: History and Jointness.

c. Special Theme: Transformation.

JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP)

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

Lesson No. 3-8-L/S

Directed Study (28 October, 1300-1500)

1. Introduction. In Title 10, United States Code, Congress charged the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) with strategic planning responsibilities. To discharge his responsibilities, the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders, employs the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS is the primary means employed to ensure that the force development activities of the Services and the operational planning conducted by the commanders and staffs of the unified commands are responsive to the national command authorities, national security policies, and CJCS direction. This lesson will examine the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) which is one of the main products of JSPS. This key JSPS document provides the commanders of combatant commands comprehensive guidance and direction for the accomplishment of military tasks. It is the foundation document for unified and joint operations, deliberate planning, and for containment planning. From the perspective of the combatant commander, the JSCP is his "marching order." To the Service component commanders and their subordinate commanders, the JSCP drives the development of the Mission Essential Task List (METL) or Service-equivalent warfighting task list.

2. Learning Objectives. To enable the students to:

a. Analyze the content of the JSCP and understand how the JSCP translates national military strategy into tasking for the unified commands as well as the Service Chiefs.

b. Synthesize the information on adaptive planning and demonstrate the ability to apply flexible deterrent options.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) During the Directed Study period, review the Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the handout entitled "Student Instructions--IJSCP Exercise." Pay particular attention to how the JSCP is organized and where information is located. **The Seminar Security Officer will obtain seven copies of the IJSCP (CJCSM 3110.01B, 15 November 2001) and secure them in the study room prior to 0830, 28 October.**

(2) The students will receive a briefing on the IJSCP at the SECRET level presented in Bliss Hall followed by a question-and-answer period. This lecture will incorporate updates as communicated by the Joint Staff **in the annual update to the Army War College faculty.**

(3) During the last hour, the students will meet with their seminar instructors to discuss questions or clarify points from the lecture.

b. Required Reading.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, SECRET (Classified Library), dated November 2001. This document provides the instructional version of the JSCP document. It provides strategic guidance, including apportionment of resources to the Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of the Services, to accomplish assigned strategic tasks based on military capabilities existing at the beginning of the planning period. This document is classified and can only be used in the seminar room, seminar study room, or in the Classified Library. **To be read by U.S. students only.**

c. Suggested Reading.

Joint Pub 5-0: Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995, pp. II-4 thru II-12. [Library Student Issue]

4. Points to Consider.

- a. Is the JSCP guidance timely and sufficient for the development of war plans?
- b. What challenges do the Combatant Commanders now face because of the adaptive planning concept?
- c. How does the JSCP facilitate the National Security Strategy?
- d. How do you think the JSCP will change with the new administration?
- e. How do you think the JSCP will change as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

- a. PJE LA 1.a. Objectives; Readings; Exercise; Points to Consider.
- b. PJE LA 1.b. Objectives; Readings; Exercise.
- c. PJE LA 2.a. Objectives; Readings; Exercise.

- d. PJE LA 2.b. Exercise.
- e. PJE LA 3.a. Objectives; Readings; Exercise.
- f. PJE LA 3.b. Objectives; Readings; Exercise; Points to Consider.
- g. PJE LA 3.c. Objectives; Readings; Exercise; Points to Consider.
- h. PJE LA 4.a. Objectives; Readings; Exercise; Points to Consider.
- i. PJE LA 4.b. Objectives; Readings; Exercise; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
- b. Enduring Theme: Jointness.
- c. Special Theme: Warfare in the 21st Century.

FORCE MANAGEMENT

Mode: Seminar and Case Study
Directed Study (29 October 2002, 1300-1500)

Lesson No. 3-9-S/CS

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson has two parts. The first part examines how The Army takes an identified capability shortfall or a vision for future warfighting capability, develops operational concepts, turns the concept into a validated requirement, and develops and prioritizes solutions for that requirement to provide the desired capability. The second part explores Army transformation as a case study. You will examine the benefits, risks, consequences, and implications associated with strategic decisions on force management and examine institutional processes for managing change in The Army that respond to those decisions.

b. Force management, in its simplest context, is the management of change to achieve the development and sustainment of combat-ready units. The Army's force management process determines force requirements and implements programs to meet those requirements. Your studies should take the "mystery" out of how the requirement for capability is identified, prioritized, and provided to commanders, and the challenges The Army faces whenever it changes or "transforms."

c. Based on evolving national security requirements, The Army develops warfighting concepts. These concepts drive changes to doctrine, training, organizations, facilities, and materiel to improve force capability. The effective and efficient management of change requires that we achieve the transition to new operational concepts, new organizations, and new materiel with minimum adverse impact on current readiness.

d. General William W. Hartzog, Retired, recent Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, also indicated that, "Because of the hectic pace of change and limited resources, the process for determining requirements can be neither as linear as it once was nor can it afford to become undisciplined. In the attempt to keep pace with the current rapidity of change, the process of determining requirements has become fractious.... No one wishes to throttle creativity or ingenuity; however, both integration and discipline must be achieved to move into the future with efficiency." This balance between nonlinearity/rapidity and maintaining a disciplined approach to determining priority requirements continues to be problematic.

2. Learning Objectives.

- a. Comprehend the processes used to determine Army requirements in support of the National Military Strategy and Joint Vision 2020.
- b. Comprehend how Army processes convert future warfighting concepts into future landpower capabilities.
- c. Analyze how Army force management systems relate to corresponding DOD and joint systems.
- d. Comprehend the major processes and systems of Army force management and their relationships.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Read the required readings to prepare for directed study small-group work and seminar discourse on force management. Apply force management concepts in a case study analysis of the Army's transformation to the objective force. Students will have Directed Study time on 29 October for small-group work on the case study. Student groups will brief their case-study findings on 30 October.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Department of the Army. Army Transformation Roadmap. [Student Initial Issue for Course1]

(2) U.S. Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002. Chapter 5, pp. 5-1 thru 5-10 and 5-17 thru 5-27. [Student Initial Issue]

(3) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume I. [Student Issue]

(a) Department of the Army. Concepts for the Objective Force White Paper, pp. 373-398.

(b) Steele, Dennis. "The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Army Digitization." Army, September 2001, pp. 399-414.

(4) Objective Force Case Study materials. [Instructor Handout]

c. Focused Reading.

U.S. General Accounting Office. "Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams," GAO-02-442, 17 May 2002, pp. 1-37. Available at: <<http://www.gao.gov>>.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) Kauchak, Marty. "Transforming Land Warfare." Armed Forces Journal International, July 2001, pp. 14-17.

(2) Riggs, John M., LTG. Statement Before the House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittees on Military Procurement and Military Research and Development, United States House of Representatives. Testimony on Ground Force Modernization, April 11, 2002. Available at: <<http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-04-11riggs.html>>.

(3) U.S. Army Public Affairs. "Army Transformation Wargame Insights Honing Objective Force Development," Release #01-033, 1 May 2001. Available at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/May2001/r20010502atwg01.html>>.

4. Points to Consider.

a. How can existing systems and processes of Army force management keep pace with warfighting needs of the 21st Century battlespace?

b. How do you derive requirements for a "capabilities-based force" that drive force development in a timely manner? How does this differ from a "threat-based" requirements process?

c. How do joint requirements become Service programs? Is this link strong enough to ensure cross-Service interoperability and joint force management?

d. What effect do the relationships between key players at Department of Defense, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and the Army have on the force management process?

e. What are some of the force management impediments to transforming The Army? What are some ways strategic leaders can overcome these impediments?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

- a. PJE LA 2.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- b. PJE LA 3.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- c. PJE LA 3.b. Objectives; Points to Consider.
- d. PJE LA 6.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 1 and 5.
- b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Vision and Jointness.
- c. Special Themes: Warfare in the 21st Century and Transformation.

TRANSFORMATION: PARTNERING WITH INDUSTRY

Mode: Lecture/Panel/Seminar

Lesson No. 3-10-L/P/S

1. Introduction.

a. The United States Army's current force structure was designed for the Cold War. New challenges require an Army that can respond rapidly to a variety of missions anywhere in the world, from peacekeeping and peacemaking, to major war. The United States Army must be capable of exercising strategic dominance across the entire spectrum of operations. To facilitate this goal and effectively support the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, the Army's heavy units must become more deployable with a smaller logistical footprint. Concurrently, light forces must become more lethal and survivable. Equipping the future force with the "right stuff" in a rapid and efficient manner provides a unique challenge for industry and the Army's Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) community.

b. The Chief of Staff of the Army has provided an Army vision to transform today's Army into an Objective Force designed to meet tomorrow's challenges. The cornerstone of tomorrow's Army will be the yet-to-be-designed Future Combat System (FCS), which is slated for fielding in the next decade. The FCS will be more than just a follow-on to the 70-ton Abrams tank; it will be a "system of systems," all working together to increase battlefield mobility, survivability, and lethality. To be successful, FCS will have to leverage the cutting edge of science and technology and capitalize on knowledge resident in industry.

c. Since the Objective Force will make use of advanced technology that may not even exist today, The Army is proceeding simultaneously along three tracks to achieve transformation.

(1) The Army must recapitalize and modernize the Legacy Force—the existing battle-proven equipment that is doing the heavy lifting for U.S. national security around the world today. Seventy-five percent of the Army's most critical systems are overage. With age and continued usage, operation and support costs increase exponentially. Operation and support costs of legacy systems must be brought down to make dollars available for transformation. In the short term, recapitalization of the force will compete for scarce resources, but it is necessary to preserve the essential capabilities required to support the National Military Strategy until the Objective Force is fielded. In the long term, operation and support cost savings through recapitalization will help make transformation affordable.

(2) The Army will transform in three phases: the formation of initial brigades, the fielding of an Interim Force, and the eventual transformation to an Objective Force. The

Army is starting with the formation of two Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) at Fort Lewis, WA. The IBCTs will also permit ongoing experimentation to define the characteristics necessary in the Objective Force and also allow The Army to train soldiers and grow leaders while developing doctrine and refining the organizations for the Interim Force. Once the organizational concepts and requirements have been refined, The Army will field an Interim Force of five brigades that will utilize off-the-shelf, medium-weight vehicles weighing no more than 20 tons that are transportable aboard C-130 aircraft. The Interim Force will satisfy the nation's immediate requirements for rapidly deployable, lethal, and sustainable ground forces until the Objective Force is eventually fielded.

(3) Adequate funding for science and technology (S&T) is critical to make the Objective Force a reality. Technology is one of the keys to assuring the U.S. military preserves its overmatch capability against potential adversaries. Advances in information operations, materiel, and weapons system survivability and lethality will enable the Objective Force to achieve the same effectiveness of today's heavy forces with fewer, lighter, and more reliable systems. Just as the S&T funding of the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the overwhelming capabilities of the 1990s, during this period The Army will leverage focused S&T efforts to meet the specific technology needs of the Objective Force.

d. Transformation—today's vision—is the latest in a series of efforts The Army has undertaken to maintain its edge as the world's supreme fighting force. The fundamental principles behind the transformation and the desired objectives are not new. Sun Tzu stated in the year 500 BC, "Rapidity is the essence of war; take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unguarded routes and attack unguarded spots." To continue to dominate across the full spectrum of operations and to be "persuasive in peace and invincible in war," The Army must change and be equipped differently.

e. Military professionals must understand the DOD and Army management system used for research, development, and acquisition systems, and the role of science and technology in transforming the Army. They must also gain an enhanced understanding of the requirements determination process and the industry-military relationship.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the importance of gaining familiarity and confidence in dealing with industry, the DOD and Army management system used for research, development, and acquisition systems, and Science and Technology.

b. Comprehend the trade-offs inherent in competing demands for resources for recapitalization of the Legacy Force, procurement of an Interim Force, and development of an Objective Force.

c. Comprehend and gain practical knowledge in how the Defense Industry functions and the Army's role in setting requirements.

d. Analyze the linkage between the effective implementation of science and technology and Army Transformation.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Attend the lecture and participate in the industry panel question-and-answer period as well as contribute to subsequent seminar dialog in the classroom.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002. Chapter 11, read pp. 11-27 to 11-33 and 11-45 to 11-48; scan pp. 11-1 to 11-12 and 11-49 to 11-78. Also available at:
<<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/LinkedHTARChapters/CHAPTER11.pdf>>.

(2) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume II. [Student Issue]

(a) Dombrowski, Peter J.; Gholz, Eugene; and Ross, Andrew L. "Selling Military Transformation: The Defense Industry and Innovation." Orbis, Summer 2002, pp. 1-14.

(b) Army War College Course Paper. "The Defense Acquisition Process 2001." Spring 2002, pp. 15-44.

(c) Army War College Course Paper. "Why Does It Take So Long and Cost So Much for the Military to Buy Weapon Systems?" Spring 2002, pp. 45-68.

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume II. [Student Issue]

(a) AUSA. "Army Recapitalization—A Focused Investment in Today's Army." The Institute of Land Warfare, March 2002, pp. 69-84. Also available at:
<<http://www.ausa.org/ilw>>.

(b) AUSA. "The U.S. Army's Transformation to the Objective Force." The Institute of Land Warfare, September 2001, pp. 85-96. Also available at:
<<http://www.ausa.org/ilw>>.

(c) Sapolsky, Harvey M. "Buying Weapons Without an Enemy." Breakthroughs, Spring 2001, pp. 97-105.

(2) Available in the Seminar Room and on the Internet:

(a) General Accounting Office. "Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes." GAO Report GAO-02-701, July 2002, pp. 2-10. Also available at: <<http://www.gao.gov>>.

(b) General Accounting Office. "Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams." GAO Report GAO-02-442, May 17, 2002, pp. 1-37. Also available at: <<http://www.gao.gov>>.

(c) Gouré, Daniel, and Ranney, Jeffrey M. Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the Millennium. Scan pp. 110-123, read pp. 124-131.

d. Focused Reading. [To be assigned by the Faculty Instructor]

4. Points to Consider.

a. How does industry manage nonsynchronous technological development and procurement cycles ...7-10-year procurement cycle compared to technological obsolescence every 2-5 years? Is the continuous fielding of a "capabilities-based" force with relatively modernized technology feasible?

b. What are "blind spots" in the military's appreciation for industry priorities and modes of operation?

c. How can we reduce the development and procurement cycle time? How can industry and the military better work together to design systems capable of exploiting future technological advances?

d. What are the implications of Army Transformation for the defense industrial base? What processes and system changes may emerge that might advantage industry or cause increased risk?

e. What has been the impact of DOD's reduced investment in R&D over the past years? Has it impacted the current Army Transformation initiative? How does industry fund R&D efforts today? How could funding be improved for the benefit of both the military and industry?

f. Today, advancements in technology are primarily driven by private industry. With the Army's goal of maintaining an "open architecture" adaptive to future advancements, how do proprietary concerns impair this effort?

g. What specific challenges does industry face in supporting the Army's Transformation?

h. The government's emphasis recently has been on "commercial, off-the-shelf" (COTS) procurement in lieu of government specifications. What are the successes and limitations of this approach?

i. How does industry maintain continuity in their organizations and programs in light of the uncertainty of DOD budgets and the government's tendency to budget on an annual basis vice multiyear?

j. How has industry reconciled changes in the overall market, particularly the defense market, with the need to maintain stockholder confidence and provide a reasonable return on investments? How does industry strike a balance between military-related investment and risk management? How has the recent increase in defense spending due to the War on Terrorism affected this equation?

k. As The Army moves toward Transformation, increasing reliance will be placed on contractor support. How does industry reconcile "risk" on the battlefield and what does industry expect from the military in terms of security and support?

l. When DOD or the Services cancel a major weapon system acquisition, what is the impact and implications to that defense company's business base? Why aren't the savings immediate? What is the impact to overhead rates and why are the costs of other DOD systems produced at that defense company frequently effected?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

a. PJE LA 1.c. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.

b. PJE LA 2.a. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.

c. PJE LA 2.b. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.

d. PJE LA 2.c. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.

e. PJE LA 3.a. Objectives; Points to Consider.

f. PJE LA 6.a. Readings; Objectives; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

a. ILOs: 1, 2, and 5.

b. Enduring Themes: History, Strategic Vision, and Jointness.

c. Special Themes: Warfare in the 21st Century, Civil-Military Relations, and Transformation.

MANNING THE FORCE

Mode: Lecture/Panel

Lesson No. 3-11-L/P

1. Introduction.

a. The Army's Vision of being more strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the operational spectrum has three component parts: Readiness, Transformation, and **People**. Issues regarding people cannot ever be considered separately from other issues. Without highly skilled, competent, and dedicated people, our most lethal weapons and reorganized formations will fail. People are inextricably linked to combat readiness, and therefore directly affect the institutional strength of The Army from all aspects. The object of this lesson is to better understand the relationship of systems and priorities for manning the force.

b. Manning and personnel management systems touch every aspect of our lives and careers in ways that are so deeply embedded and integral to the Army culture that we rarely reflect on them and we certainly have difficulty changing them. Recently, both the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army have remarked publicly that we cannot achieve Transformation without transforming the "personnel system." The "personnel system" represents many different things about the military culture to different senior leaders. This lesson will focus on many of the challenges facing senior leaders today as they struggle to envision needed framework changes to support the human dimension of soldiering further into the 21st century.

c. This lesson examines the critical role of Army manpower and personnel systems, their impact on Army transformation, and Army transformation's impact on them. We will consider how requirements for personnel are determined and validated and how recruiting policies and strategies are executed. We will review manpower planning and programming as a complex and critical part of force structure, much like weapons systems programming and the acquisition process, **but with a human dimension**.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. To comprehend that military human resource management systems for structuring, acquiring, training, distributing, compensating, and transitioning soldiers and officers are a multifaceted mosaic of interacting subsystems which interface with, and impact on, all other major Army systems.

b. To consider the nature and complexity of actions deemed essential by senior leaders to appropriately shape and support the force in this period of significant change.

c. To analyze potential second- and third-order effects of the difficult options and decisions facing The Army regarding its people during the period of transformation.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Attend the lecture and participate in panel discussions.

b. Required Readings.

U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume II. [Student Issue]

(a) Le Moyne, John M., LTG, and Childress, Franklin, LTC. "Personnel Transformation: Not a Question of Whether...But How Soon?" Army AL&T, July-August 2002, pp. 106-108. Also available at: <https://aim.rdaisa.army.mil/alt/home.cfm>.

(b) Dueitt, B. Sue, MG. "Personnel Transformation: The Journey Continues." Army AL&T, July-August 2002, pp. 109-110. Also available at: <https://aim.rdaisa.army.mil/alt/home.cfm>.

(c) Drillings, Michael, Dr., and Killion, Thomas, Dr. "MANPRINT Perspectives on Personnel Transformation." Army AL&T, July-August 2002, pp. 111-113. Also available at: <https://aim.rdaisa.army.mil/alt/home.cfm>.

(d) Rumsey, Michael G., Dr. "Selection and Assessment Systems to Support Personnel Transformation." Army AL&T, July-August 2002, pp. 114-116. Also available at: <https://aim.rdaisa.army.mil/alt/home.cfm>.

c. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002. Chapter 13, "Military Human Resource Management," and pp. 15-1 thru 15-10 in Chapter 15, "Army Training." [Student Initial Issue] Also available at: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/Welcome.html>.

(2) Wass de Czege, Huba, BG (Ret), and Biever, Jacob D., MAJ. "Soldiers--Not Technology--Are the Key to Continued Superiority." Army Magazine, March 2001. Also available at: <http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf>.

(3) "Leadership in the 21st Century: Is it Time to Change the System?" Army Magazine, December 2000, pp. 10-14. [Library Reserve Shelf]

(4) Freedberg, Sydney J., Jr. "Reforming the Ranks." National Journal, August 4, 2001, pp. 84-90. [Library Reserve Shelf]. Also available at: <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?Did=000000077240462&Fmt=4&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=20&Sid=2&RQT=309>.

(5) "New Key to More Control Over Your Career." Army Times, 26 August 2002, pp. 14-16. Also available at: [CBNet](#); [Library's Electronic Resources](#); [Choose EBSCOhost](#); [Click EBSCOhost Web](#); [Type article title in search box](#); [Click Search button](#); [Click PDF Full Text](#).

(6) Vandergriff, Donald E., MAJ. The Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs. Novata, CA: Presidio Press, Inc., 2002. [Library Reserve Shelf]

(7) Manta, Julie T. An Enlisted Assignment System for a Transformed Army. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2001.

(8) Atkins, J. Mark. The Army's Soldier Life Cycle Model: Valid for the Objective Force? Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002.

(9) Garcia, Wayne L. Recruiting: The New Primary Market and Congressional Legislation Affecting It. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002.

(10) Bartholomew, Donald A. PERSTEMPO Legislation: War on Terrorism and Beyond. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002.

4. Points to Consider.

a. How does The Army determine manpower requirements during this significant period of transformation? What are the key management systems used and what operating principles should be considered critical?

b. How do strategic leaders identify, prioritize, and balance human strengths and weaknesses when developing new technologies, doctrine, and training methods as part of transformation?

c. What does each of us mean when we say "fix the personnel system"? Which aspects of the system that "grew" our current senior leaders should they discard and which should they keep and change? What are the cultural aspects of military personnel management that need to/need not be changed, and why?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

- a. PJE LA 2.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- b. PJE LA 2.b. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- c. PJE LA 3.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- d. PJE LA 3.c. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- e. PJE LA 6.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 1 and 5.
- b. Enduring Themes: Ethics, Jointness, and Human Dimensions of Strategic Leadership.
- c. Special Theme: Transformation.

ARMY COMPONENTS

Mode: Seminar

Lesson No. 3-12-S

1. Introduction.

a. The Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Department of the Army Civilians compose almost two-thirds of The Army. All three components are subject to the same pressures, issues, and instability being felt by the Active force, yet misconceptions abound between the components. An argument could also be made that civilian contractors are quickly becoming another component of the force with current efforts to out-source traditional military functions.

b. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have become a larger percentage of the total force and are essential partners in a wide range of military operations, from smaller-scale contingencies to major theater war. Guard and Reserve forces provide both trained units and individuals to fight in wartime and to support DOD peace operations. Today, no major military operation can be successful without them. Reserve Components are being called upon more frequently and for longer periods in peacetime than ever before because of high operating and personnel tempo demands on the Active Component. In many cases, the particular type of unit needed to meet the operational requirement only exists within the Reserve force structure.

c. The demonstrated potential of the Reserve Components to provide increased military capability at lower cost has influenced changes in the mix of Active, Reserve, and civilian forces. The Reserve Components not only continue to serve in their traditional role as a hedge against uncertainty, but they also provide a more robust and blended deployable force to ease operating and personnel tempo. However, the increased routine deployments of Reserve forces have also adversely impacted recruitment, retention, morale, and the civilian careers of Reserve members.

d. A professional staff of Army civilian personnel and contractors provide expertise and continuity to virtually every phase of planning, administration, policy, maintenance, and service support. The civil service part of this component has been considerably reduced in personnel manning over the past five years, receiving a proportionately larger percentage of cuts than the military force (44% and climbing). Further reductions are inevitable, as civilian-manned organizations throughout the Army are

challenged to compete with outside contractors in establishing the most cost-effective

mix within the work force. The second-order effects of these force reductions and corresponding hiring freezes, as well as the limitations on flexibility of civil service rules, have drastically reduced the recruitment of new and younger personnel into civilian service throughout the 1990s. As a result, 88 percent of the Army's civilian work force will be retirement eligible by 2010.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the evolving role of the Army professional civilian component and how it helps The Army meet its mission.

b. Analyze the implications of the increased reliance on the Reserve forces in the 21st Century.

c. Comprehend the synergy of the Army's components. Analyze the integration of these components and the implications on the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan and overall force structure.

d. Understand the implications of competing and contracting out an increasing number of missions and functions to commercial contractors in areas currently staffed by civilian or uniformed personnel.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. DA Civilians and Reserve Component students will brief their respective components and lead seminar dialogue on missions, capabilities, and evolving roles.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002. [Student Initial Issue]

(a) Chapter 7: Read Section V, pp. 7-6 to 7-18 and Scan pp. 7-1 to 7-5 and 7-19 to 7-31. Available at:
<<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/LinkedHTARChapters/CHAPTER7.pdf>>.
Accessed 10 September 2002.

(b) Chapter 14: Read Sections I and II, pp. 14-1 to 14-5 and Scan pp. 14-5 to 14-28. Available at:
<<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/LinkedHTARChapters/CHAPTER14.pdf>>.
Accessed 10 September 2002.

c. Focused Readings.

(1) Cahlink, George. "Identity Crisis: The National Guard is Torn Between Two Missions: Backing Up the Active-Duty Military and Serving as a Homeland Security Force," pp. 1-7. Available at: <<http://www.govexec.com/features/0902/0902s5.htm>>. Accessed 6 September 2002.

(2) Henry, Patrick T. "Leading the Investment in Human Potential for America's Army." Army 2000-01 Green Book, October 2000, pp. 51-58. (Not Internet Accessible)

(3) "Work Force Should Be Stable." AUSA News, September 2002, pp. 1-4. Available at: <<http://ausa.org/ausanews>>. Accessed 10 September 2002.

(4) U.S. Department of the Army. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel Policy). FY02-07 Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan, pp. 1-8. Available at: <<http://www.cpol.army.mil/library/armyplans/sp02-07/index.html>>. Accessed 10 September 2002.

(5) Owens, Dallas D., Jr. "AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge." Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001, pp. 1-52. Available at: <<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2001/ac-rc/ac-rc.htm>>. Accessed 10 September 2002. [Two per seminar room]

(6) Plewes, Thomas J. "Reserve is Indispensable for 21st Century Army." The Officer, January-February 2000, pp. 44-47. (Not Internet Accessible)

(7) Shelton, Henry H. "Total Force – One Standard." The Officer, January-February 2000, pp. 28-30. (Not Internet Accessible)

(8) Army National Guard Fact Sheet, pp. 1-15. Available at: <http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/downloads/fact_sheets/arng.shtml>. Accessed 6 September 2002.

(9) U.S. Army Reserve Annual Report. [Two per seminar room]

(10) Army National Guard Posture Statement. [Two per seminar room]

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) National Guard and Militias. Available at: <http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/downloads/fact_sheets/guard.shtml>. Accessed 6 September 2002.

(2) Air National Guard Fact Sheet. Available at:
<http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/downloads/fact_sheets/ang.shtml>. Accessed 6 September 2002.

4. Points to Consider.

- a. What are the advantages and disadvantages of mobilizing the Reserve for war or major contingencies in terms of ends, ways, and means?
- b. What are the second- and third-order effects of using the Reserve Components for routine peacetime operations or in support of long-duration contingency missions?
- c. What are the implications of a declining pool of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers?
- d. What are some of the short/long-term implications of out-sourcing traditional Army civilian and military functions? What are the advantages and disadvantages?
- e. Has the relationship between the Reserve and the Active Components improved, become worse, or stayed the same in recent years? What can be done, as part of transformation, to make "The Army" concept a reality?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

- a. PJE LA 1.c. Readings; Points to Consider.
- b. PJE LA 3.a. Readings; Points to Consider.
- c. PJE LA 3.c. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- d. PJE LA 6.a. Readings; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 1, 2, and 5.
- b. Enduring Themes: History, Jointness, and Strategic Vision.
- c. Special Themes: Civil-Military Relations, Transformation, and Warfare in the 21st Century.

MOBILIZATION

Mode: Seminar

Lesson No. 3-13-S

1. Introduction.

a. It is indeed unfortunate that the word Mobilization can have two meanings. Mobilization is far more than assembling and equipping of military forces in time of war or other national emergency (little “m” mobilization). Mobilization may additionally entail energizing the nation’s industrial base and citizenry to meet the military and national security needs (big “M” mobilization). Mobilizations have long been a critical factor for successful prosecution of any war. U.S. forces have often been mobilized for operations and contingencies far short of total war. Aid to civil authorities, domestic disaster relief, humanitarian interventions on foreign shores, protecting American interests abroad during local civil strife, evacuation of U.S. nationals, and cease-fire enforcement are only a few of the missions performed by mobilized American forces throughout our history.

b. Prior to this past year, the United States has always been blessed by what realtors profess as the prime consideration factor--“location, location, location.” The nation was insulated by large oceans to the east and west, and blessed with neighbors to the north and south, who if not always friendly have at least generally been benign. Consequently, the United States has always had sufficient time to react to international crises and mobilize to meet the challenges. Since the revolution, Americans have mobilized for the nation’s wars and then rapidly demobilized when peace returned. Some mobilizations had little effect on the country in general (e.g., The Mexican War). In contrast, World War II affected the entire nation. During this conflict, a large percentage of the male population was conscripted or volunteered; wives and mothers were employed in defense industries and children planted victory gardens or collected scrap metal for the war effort. Rationing (e.g., food and gasoline) was universally adopted; clearly, there was no segment of society not effected in some measure by that war, although most citizens were merely inconvenienced and did not suffer any real privation.

c. In this lesson, we will focus on several key questions. How are today’s mobilization requirements different from those of the recent past? What are the effects of increased mobilization states on our Active and Reserve Components? What policies and mechanisms determine the level of effort required, who will be needed, where they will come from, how they will get there, and how long they will stay? What industries are vital to a mobilization effort and for our national security?

d. We will look at the historic WW II industrial mobilization effort as background. Read essays on Industrial Mobilization in present day. Discuss the 12 Pillars of Mobilization (as described in Joint Pub 4-05). Using the Munitions Industry--an industry unique to our profession--we will review the general state of the industry and analyze the history of the JDAM system.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the complexity and broad scope of mobilization planning at the strategic level.

b. Synthesize the mobilization system with other processes which define the strategic environment within which the U.S. defense planners operate.

c. Analyze the planning and coordination required among OSD, the Services, and other governmental agencies to support or implement U.S. policy while balancing competing demands and resources.

d. Comprehend military mobilization policy, process, and issues.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Complete the required readings before attending class.

(2) Be prepared to discuss issues from required readings in seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 4-05: Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, 22 June 1995. Also available at:
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_05.pdf>.

(2) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume II. [Student Issue]

(a) Gutmanis, Ivars, and Starns, John F. "Whatever Happened to Defense Industrial Preparedness?" Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1997, pp. 117-123.

(b) Mullen, Steven. "Ammunition Readiness: Current Problems and Future Implications for Army Transformation." AUSA's Landpower Essay Series No. 02-1, February 2002, pp. 124-129.

(c) Bell, Anthony, and Holloway, Samuel. Case Study: Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)—Timely Arming of the Future Warrior. Course Paper. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 2002, pp. 130-151.

c. Focused Reading.

Gropman, Alan L. Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II. McNair Paper #50. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, August 1996, pp. 1-139. [Instructor Handout]

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002. Chapter 6: "Army Mobilization," pp. 6-41 to 6-45. [Student Initial Issue] Provides a process primer on Army mobilization in torturous detail.

(2) Center of Military History (CMH). CMH Pub 104-10: History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945. This is a lengthy soporific treatise covering U.S. Army mobilizations from the Revolution through WW II. Though it is probably most notable as a surefire cure for insomnia, there are nonetheless pearls to be found if one cares to wade into it. It is made available merely for general reference should one feel compelled to dig into the details of historic mobilization efforts. [Library Reserve Shelf]

(3) Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 4-05.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup, 11 November 1998. [Library Reserve Shelf and also available on JELS]

(4) Vawter, Roderick L. Industrial Mobilization: The Relevant History. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983. Although written during the Cold War, many of the issues Mr. Vawter addresses remain unresolved today.

(5) Linke, Steven R. Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The PEPCON and AVTEX Cases. McNair Paper #9. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990, pp. 1-51.

4. Points to Consider.

a. What relationships between military and civilian agencies are needed to effectively mobilize the nation?

b. What coordination is needed to mobilize forces in support of a combatant commander's requirement?

c. What are the issues inherent in the increased use of Reserve Components for ongoing operations?

d. What are the limiting factors in the rapid mobilization of forces for crisis response?

- e. What are the statutory authorities for activating the Reserve Components?
- f. Considering U.S. mobilization experience since the end of the Cold War, what is the appropriateness of the current Active/Reserve Component force structure mix?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

- a. PJE LA 1.b. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- b. PJE LA 1.d. Objectives; Readings.
- c. PJE LA 1.e. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- d. PJE LA 3.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- e. PJE LA 4.c. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 1, 2, 5, and 6.
- b. Enduring Themes: History and Jointness.
- c. Special Theme: Transformation.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MACA)

Mode: Seminar/Case Study/Exercise

Lesson No. 3-14-S/CS/EX

1. Introduction.

a. This lesson has three parts. The first part examines the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the military's role in civil support. The second part examines the military's role in assisting civil authorities to quell civil disturbance using the Los Angeles Riot as a case study. The third part requires students to apply knowledge during an exercise involving a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event.

b. United States' forces have always been active in operations and contingencies that fell far short of total war. Aid to civil authorities, domestic disaster relief, and assistance to major events are only a few of the missions ably performed by American forces throughout our history. Today, several trends have raised the priority of these collateral missions. Heretofore, the military capabilities associated with accomplishing these mission requirements were always imbedded as capabilities within the single mission of winning the nation's wars. However, the increased emphasis and unique organizational capabilities associated with these missions now require them to be deliberately resourced as a separate mission category. With the broadening of the military's assistance to civil authorities together with the inherent organizational, doctrinal, training, and resourcing implications comes profound impacts on when, how, and with what resources we respond to these growing domestic missions. This lesson explores the wide range of MACA missions and looks at the complex processes and procedures associated with providing military support through the lenses of a case study and WMD exercise.

c. During the morning session, each seminar will receive instruction on MACA and the FRP. Students will also discuss the case study on the Los Angeles Riot and the use of Reserve Components during Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS).

d. During the afternoon session, each seminar will conduct a case-study exercise within their seminar. This exercise focuses on crisis and consequence management for a fictional WMD event. The exercise will put the student in one of six roles. The six roles are:

(1) National Security Council and Office of Homeland Security.

(2) Department of Defense.

(3) Federal Emergency Management Agency.

- (4) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (5) State Governor and National Guard.
- (6) "The Locals."

At least one Reserve Component Flag Officer and perhaps a media person may join each seminar for the exercise.

2. Learning Objectives (General).

- a. At the strategic level, comprehend the complexity of the appropriate federal response to a broad range of domestic contingencies.
- b. Know the MACA-related environment within which U.S. defense planners must operate.
- c. Comprehend MACA policy, process, and issues.

(1) Comprehend the overall framework for preparedness and response to domestic emergencies including the legal and regulatory basis of national resource allocation for catastrophic disasters.

(2) Analyze the roles and responsibilities of the primary players at the national strategic level and understand the coordination process when national plans are activated.

3. Learning Objectives (Los Angeles Riot Case Study).

- a. Comprehend the issues inherent in the use of the Reserve Components for MACDIS.
- b. Understand the legal basis for MACDIS.

4. Learning Objectives (WMD Case Study).

a. Examine a terrorist weapon of mass destruction incident and the implications to the local response community and state and federal agencies.

b. Analyze the roles and responsibilities of the primary players and understand the coordination process when national plans are activated.

c. Discuss options to provide timely information to the population and assist in minimizing chaos.

5. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks.

(1) Watch “Military Assistance to Civil Law Enforcement” tape prior to class (see schedule of times for multiple showings).

(2) Working as a member of your seminar, students will discuss the Los Angeles Riot case study and participate in the WMD exercise.

b. Required Readings.

(1) U.S. Army War College. Selected Readings, AY 2003. Course 3: Joint Processes and Landpower Development, Volume II. [Student Issue]

(a) Davis, Shelley. “Fighting Bioterror.” The Retired Officers Magazine, April 2002. pp. 152-158. Available at:
<http://www.troa.org/Magazine/April2002/f_bioterror.asp>.

(b) Weiss, Aaron. “When Terror Strikes, Who Should Respond?” Parameters 31 (Autumn 2001): pp. 159-175. Available at:
<<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Weiss.htm>>.

(c) Federal Emergency Management Agency. “Federal Response Plan.” April 1999, pp. 176-192. Available at: <<http://www.fema.gov/rrr/frp/>>.

(2) U.S. Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002. Chapter 23, pp. 23-1 to 23-29. [Student Initial Issue] Available at:
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/LinkedHTARChapters/CHAPTER_23.pdf>.

(3) WMD exercise materials. [Instructor Handout]

c. Focused Reading.

Schnaubelt, Christopher M. “Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots.” Parameters 27 (Summer 1997): pp. 99-120. Available at:
<<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97summer/schnau.htm>>.

d. Suggested Readings.

(1) DOD Directive 3025.15: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, 18 February 1997. Available at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/>>.

(2) CJCSI 3125.01: Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High Yield Explosive Situation, 3 August 2001. Available at: https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/cjcsi/3125_01.pdf.

(3) Lujan, Thomas R. "Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army." Parameters 27 (Autumn 1997): pp. 82-97. Available at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97autumn/lujan.htm>.

6. Points to Consider.

- a. What determines the roles, responsibilities, and approaches as set forth in the national plan?
- b. Who will be in charge of operations; with what assets; to achieve what outcomes; and by what means?
- c. What is the mechanism used to obtain MACA? What are the impacts on our Active and Reserve Components?
- d. How is our nation prepared to deal with chemical, biological, nuclear and high-explosive terrorism threats?

7. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

- a. PJE LA 1.a. Objectives; Readings; Case Study.
- b. PJE LA 1.b. Objectives; Readings; Case Study.
- c. PJE LA 1.c. Objectives; Readings; Case Study.
- d. PJE LA 3.a. Objectives; Readings; Case Study.
- e. PJE LA 3.c. Objectives; Readings; Case Study.

8. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 2, 3, 4, and 5.
- b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Vision, History, and Jointness.
- c. Special Themes: Homeland Security, Warfare in the 21st Century, and Transformation.

TRENDS IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET

Mode: Lecture/Seminar

Lesson No. 3-15-L/S

1. Introduction.

a. A familiar refrain throughout the defense establishment involves whether requirements drive the budget or the budget drives requirements. At the national level, the term requirements is replaced by strategy; however, the refrain is the same regardless of the organizational level. We looked at strategy formulation during Course 2 and have realized that, in many cases, the balance between ends, ways, and means is affected by the availability of the means. Today's lesson will examine the availability of the means at the highest level, meaning the Defense share of the Federal Budget.

b. Since the end of the Cold War we have had a Base Force articulated by General Powell; we have had a Bottom-Up Review Force driven by Mr. Aspin's review; we have had the 97 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Force by direction of the Congress; and we completed 01 QDR with indeterminate results on force structure due probably to other events. In each case, the question of whether strategy or resources drove the analysis was an issue.

c. Today's lesson will explore the external pressures on the Defense share of the Federal Budget. These pressures include macro-strategic issues as well as more prosaic political realities. The lecture will put these pressures into historical context and will provide a framework for considering future pressures that will be explored during the seminar discussion. The lesson as a whole should set the stage for considering defense resource allocation in the succeeding lesson.

2. Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the future Federal fiscal environment and the dynamics of the national political fiscal decisionmaking structure.

b. Evaluate the trends in the Federal Budget and appraise the effects they will have on future defense budgets.

3. Student Requirements.

a. Tasks. Attend the lecture and participate in seminar.

b. Required Readings.

(1) Institute of Land Warfare. Fiscal Year 2003: Army Budget – An Analysis. Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, June 2002. Read pp. 1-28. [Student Issue]

(2) Ippolito, Dennis S. Budget Policy and Fiscal Risk: Implications for Defense. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2001, pp. 1-31. [Instructor Handout]

c. Supplemental Readings.

(1) Congressional Budget Office. The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2003-2012. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2002. Available at: < <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3277&sequence=0> >.

(2) Congressional Budget Office. The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2002. Available at: <<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3735&sequence=0>>.

(3) Congressional Budget Office. Glossary of Budgetary and Other Economic Terms. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, undated. Available at: <<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3280&sequence=0>>.

4. Points to Consider.

a. If the trends presented by Dr. Ippolito are credible, must we revise the ends – ways – means paradigm?

b. Even in a benign fiscal environment, is strategy ever truly resource unconstrained?

c. What would it take for the projected budget surpluses to be made available to the Department of Defense?

d. What would cause a reversal of the trends highlighted by Dr. Ippolito? Is this likely?

5. Relationship to Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas.

- a. PJE LA 1.c. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- b. PJE LA 2.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- c. PJE LA 3.a. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.
- d. PJE LA 5.d. Objectives; Readings; Points to Consider.

6. Relationship to USAWC Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), Enduring and Special Themes.

- a. ILOs: 1, 4, and 5.
- b. Enduring Themes: Strategic Vision and Jointness.
- c. Special Themes: Homeland Security and Transformation.

TRENDS IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET

Lesson No. 3-15-L/S, Thursday, 7 November 2002 (0830-1130)

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TRENDS IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET

Lesson No. 3-15-L/S, Thursday, 7 November 2002 (0830-1130)

SUGGESTED TIME SCHEDULE

0830 – 0920

Lecture in Bliss Hall

0940 – 1020

Question and Answer Session in Bliss Hall

1035 – 1130

Seminar Dialogue

TRENDS IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET

Lesson No. 3-15-L/S, Thursday, 7 November 2002 (0830-1130)

FACULTY OVERVIEW

BACKGROUND

This lesson follows the standard model for a lecture followed by seminar dialog. On the day before the lecture a brief introduction of the lecture could include the following extract from his bio:

Dr Ippolito is a Professor of Political Science at Southern Methodist University. His research centers on political institutions and public policy, particularly budget policy. He will tell the class that he is not a Defense Expert but is an expert on how much money defense can expect in its budget.

We expect to have copies of his slides in sufficient time to hand out before the lecture. He wants us to do this because his slides are hard to read in Bliss Hall. Copies of the slides he used last year are at Tab E. (PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THESE PREVIOUS CHARTS).

LECTURE

I expect his major points to be:

- Surplus projections are problematic
- In the short term defense will compete for funds with domestic discretionary spending.
- In the long term, entitlement reform will be required to provide any money at all for defense.
- In both time frames, strong Presidential leadership will be required.

SEMINAR

What does this mean to the Defense Department?

- Need leadership to get and keep resources due to entitlement pressure.
- Interservice competition will become more intense.
- Is the recent consensus for more defense resources liable to last.

Can the entitlement trend continue?

What has to change to effect the entitlement trend?

TRENDS IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET

Lesson No. 3-15-L/S, Thursday, 7 November 2002 (0830-1130)

SYNOPSIS OF READINGS

Required

Ippolito, Dennis S., Budget Policy and Fiscal Risk: Implications for Defense. Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2001.

Pamphlet written as the Bush tax cut was being debated and ultimately enacted. It includes an explanation of the deficit-debt dynamic; a review of deficit reduction efforts of the 80's & 90's; explanation of budget projection uncertainties; a discussion of the potential implications for defense funding in the near term (through 2010), and long term (after 2010).

Traditionally debt levels have been closely tied to wars and recessions. Generally debt went up during wartime and decreased in peacetime except during recessions. This model changed in the 60's with the greatly expanded federal social welfare commitments. This caused the debt to rise in peacetime regardless of economic conditions. This deficit is titled structural because it is caused by policy spending exceeding revenues. The 60's social policies linked with Reagan tax cut, his increase in defense, Congress refusal to cut other discretionary made these deficits much worse in the 80's.

First attempt at deficit control was Gramm Rudman Hollings (GRH) law (85) that established deficit ceilings and mandated sequestrations (not allowing appropriated funds to be spent) to enforce the them. Sequestrations could only be applied to certain types of spending (discretionary) so it was not effective for large deficits. Bush (#41) attempted to craft bipartisan deficit reduction packages. He got an initial agreement (90) that was balanced but that failed in Congress so what was actually passed included higher tax rates and sharply reduced entitlement savings. The first Clinton (93) deficit reduction included revenue increases and avoided entitlement reform. The second Clinton effort stemmed from the republican congressional victory in 94, and the 95 government shutdowns. It (97) was very modest but included both a small tax cut and discretionary/entitlement savings. But, as we know, deficits came down dramatically due to revenue growth based on the economy and slowing of mandatory spending growth based on lower inflation and unexpected Medicare savings. Bottom line is that the deficit/surplus swung by 6.3% of GDP, 2.1 of which due to increases in individual tax receipts, and 2.2% due to defense spending decreases.

Budget projections are uncertain because they are based on estimates of rates of economic growth, inflation and productivity which may change. They are also based on policies which may change.

In the short term, the projected budget surpluses may be used for debt reduction, allow tax cuts, or increase spending. Bush (#43) tax cut has consumed a lot of the projected surplus. If the balance of the surplus is to be used for defense the Bush administration must articulate a credible NSS and organize congressional support. Post 2010 the surplus will probably disappear without entitlement reform.

US problems (especially the long term) are less severe than other countries'.

Supplemental Reading.

Congressional Budget Office. The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2003 - 2012. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2002. at <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3277&sequence=0> .

TBD

Congressional Budget Office. The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2002. at <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3735&sequence=0>.

TBD

Seminar_____

FACULTY INSTRUCTOR SHEET

Lesson 3-15, Trends in the Federal Budget

1. In my opinion Dr Ippolito's brief is/is not a keeper.
2. In the students' opinion the brief is/is not a keeper.
3. The Ippolito Monograph was useful in achieving learning objectives. Why?

4. Other comments?

Please return to Bill Lord in C308.

SECTION V

APPENDICES

Appendix I	Student Assessment Report
Appendix II	USAWC Mission, Institutional Learning Objectives (ILOs), and Program for Joint Education (PJE) Learning Areas and Objectives
Appendix III	USAWC Enduring and Special Themes

APPENDIX I

Student Assessment Report

Student: Rank: Seminar #: Term: Course:

Elements:	Evaluation	Evaluator's Comments
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1. Preparation

2. Participation

3. Written

Title:

4. Oral

Title:

Overall

Faculty Instructor:

Signature:

Date:

APPENDIX II

MISSION

To prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders for the responsibilities of strategic leadership.

- o Educate current and future leaders on the development and employment of landpower in a joint, multinational, and interagency environment.
- o Conduct research and publish on national security and military strategy.
- o Engage in activities in support of the Army's strategic communication efforts.

INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES (ILO)

To accomplish this mission, the USAWC curriculum is designed to produce graduates who can:

1. Distinguish the uniqueness of strategic-level leadership and apply skills and competencies required by strategic leaders.
2. In concert with other elements of national power, advise on the role of the military, especially landpower, in national security strategy formulations.
3. Analyze threats and other factors which affect U.S. interests.
4. Apply strategic thought to U.S. national security decisionmaking processes.
5. Manage change by applying resources to the Joint and Army processes for translating strategy into force requirements and capabilities.
6. Develop theater strategies, estimates, and campaign plans to employ unified, joint, and multinational forces.
7. Synthesize critical elements of warfare at the strategic and operational levels.

SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE-LEVEL LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES

SOURCE: CJCSI 1800.01: Officer Professional Military Education Policy, 1 December 2000.

1. Learning Area 1. National Security Strategy.

- a. Analyze the strategic art; i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.
- b. Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- c. Analyze how the constituent elements of government and American society exert influence on the national strategy process.

2. Learning Area 2. National Planning Systems and Processes.

- a. Comprehend the Department of Defense systems and processes by which national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated, and applied.
- b. Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- c. Analyze and apply the principal joint strategy development and operational planning processes.
- d. Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.

3. Learning Area 3. National Military Strategy and Organization.

- a. Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- b. Analyze the roles, relationships, and functions of the NCA, CJCS, JCS, Combatant Commanders, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Service Chiefs.
- c. Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.

4. Learning Area 4. Theater Strategy and Campaigning.

- a. Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.

b. Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the combatant commanders.

c. Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.

d. Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and nongovernmental organizations.

e. Comprehend the value of integrating Information Operation (IO) into theater strategies and campaigning.

5. Learning Area 5. IO and Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4).

a. Understand IO and C4 concepts and how they relate.

b. Demonstrate a thorough understanding of how IO and C4 are integrated to support the National Military and National Security Strategies and interagency process.

c. Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.

d. Understand how the joint operational planning and execution system is integrated into theater and operational IO campaign planning and execution to support theater and national strategic containment and warfighting efforts.

6. Learning Area 6. The Role of Technology in 21st Century Warfare.

a. Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and evaluate key ongoing and anticipated technological developments pertinent to the military instrument.

b. Analyze Joint Vision 2020 and the nature of warfare in the information age, to include examining key current developments.

APPENDIX III

AY 2003 THEMES **(COORDINATING AUTHORITY)**

ENDURING THEMES.

The challenge Elihu Root posed to the Army at the founding of the Army War College: "to preserve by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression, through studying and conferring on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command." Provide the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes--ethics, history, human dimensions of strategic leadership, jointness, and strategic vision--give increased meaning to the study of strategy and the national defense, military art and study of strategy and the national defense, military art and science, and command, leadership, and management. They stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

ETHICS. (DCLM)

Military leaders are entrusted with the special trust and confidence of the American people to provide for the national defense. We are responsible to those we defend and to those we lead. Because of the power inherent in the military, the fundamental values of our nation and our profession must influence all our decisions. History reminds us that senior military leaders must understand and apply the highest ethical standards to the military profession.

HISTORY. (DNSS)

History provides the context that helps us understand the origins of modern military institutions and doctrine. History also provides a broader perspective on the basic issues of national security and military strategy in broad perspective, and can offer clearer insight into the human dimension of war. Understanding of the past also affords insight and guidance for the future. At its best, the study of history helps students develop understanding, a base of knowledge, and the confidence to render effective judgments. When combined with conceptual, critical, creative, and visionary thinking, this sense of history culminates in highly effective strategic thinking. Instilling a sense of historical mindedness in our students is a major goal of the USAWC.

HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP. (DCLM)

The Army has long recognized that regardless of current doctrine and technology, wars are fought by men and women operating under conditions of extreme stress and uncertainty. As such, it is critical that strategic leaders have a deep understanding--derived from a study of history and behavioral sciences--of the complexity of human behavior under such conditions. Equally important, strategic leaders must get the best ideas and viewpoints from all stakeholders if they are to make high-quality decisions that achieve high acceptability among the diverse

groups that make up our changing Army and country. Lastly, strategic leaders must thoroughly understand the culture of the organizations they lead, how to influence that culture, and how to build healthy, resilient, learning organizations that are equal to the challenges ahead. The successful strategic leader will be one who melds all aspects of the human dimension into the practice of the strategic art.

JOINTNESS. (DMSPO/CJCS Chair)

Jointness refers to the mutual support and doctrinal understanding which must exist within all the military Services. Jointness is a state of mind as well as a statement of fact. It predisposes those who share its goals to emphasize the unique capabilities of the nation's military Services in planning and operations that are by design, from beginning to end, synergistic, cooperative, and interdependent.

STRATEGIC VISION. (DCLM)

Strategic vision is an essential element of political, corporate, and military leadership. It directs and shapes the forces and trends that affect us individually and organizationally. By defining a desired endstate and then communicating that vision to subordinates, leaders at all levels can shape and manage change toward a desired end. Leaders who have most successfully guided the destinies of people and organizations have understood and communicated the power of strategic vision.

SPECIAL THEMES.

Derived from important contemporary issues, special themes represent the types of challenges that await Army War College graduates. Themes are integrated into seminar discussions to allow the institution and students to explore challenges and objectives established for The Army by the Chief of Staff and other external sources. Special themes highlight emerging concepts of doctrine, policy, and management, and they help to focus and strengthen seminar discussions of current events and issues.

HOMELAND SECURITY. (DNSS)

Following the horrific attacks of September 11 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, homeland security has evolved from a mere consideration to the highest priority of the U.S. defense strategy. According to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, "...the defense strategy restores the emphasis once placed on defending the United States and its land, sea, air, and space approaches. It is essential to safeguard the Nation's way of life, its political institutions, and the source of its capacity to project decisive military power overseas." Strategists must understand the full range of issues that comprise this rapidly evolving mission, to include: defense of the homeland, protection of critical infrastructure, crisis and consequence management, and other domestic civil support responsibilities. Students must also comprehend the role of the U.S. military in responding to these tasks as well as how to integrate and coordinate military support with other U.S. Government organizations in this inherently interagency mission.

TRANSFORMATION. (DCLM)

True transformations of standing armies are rare. Most changes are developmental, occur incrementally, and are managed within existing systems over a long period of time. However, a historically unprecedented confluence of factors affecting the strategic and operational environments has brought the need for transforming our military to the forefront. Full-spectrum strategic deployments, asymmetrical threats, an explosion of new and applicable technologies, and increased interagency, joint, and multinational operations among many other influences are driving revolutionary changes within every Service. Correspondingly, with the publication of the Army Chief of Staff's Intent and Vision Statement in late 1999, the Army embarked upon a rapid and dramatic transformation toward a more "responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable force." The Army's transformation ultimately will affect all The Army and also influence and be affected by the other Services' transformation efforts. Strategists and strategic leaders need to understand the phenomenon of transformation and learn how it can be efficiently resourced, effectively managed, and successfully integrated and synchronized with all the Services' and joint transformation efforts to properly shape the Army of the 21st Century.

WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY. (DMSPO)

The U.S. military's operational tempo will remain high as conflict continues to erupt along seams of ethnic and religious rivalry, and economic competition. Officers of the 21st Century must capitalize on the innovative application of new technologies to become faster, leaner, and more strategically responsive. Leaders will need to perceive, comprehend, and take advantage of the changing nature of technology as it drives changes in warfare. This includes an understanding of the geostrategic impact of the information and space environments on strategy and the art of war. To enter the debate and begin influencing the future, Army War College students need to be able to think beyond current structures and programs. To accomplish this, students need to understand the relationships between the Services' ongoing modernization efforts, CJCS' Joint Vision 2020, and the emerging vision of our forces beyond.